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THE IMPACT OF THE WAR UPON LABOR LAW
DAVID ZISKIND*
Labor legislation is written on a continuous scroll. The laws of the past, the
great laws and the petty laws, all remain on the record, and the laws of the future
must be inscribed on the same scroll. There is a continuity of interest, and even
new laws appearing for the first time have a relationship to the others that makes
them all part of the same social structure. Consequently, if we look for the influ-
ence of the war upon only those portions of the scroll that were written during the
war, we will fail to see the full significance of the war legislation.
Indeed, we must look above the writing to the hands and the minds that have
written. There are always many persons, with conflicting notions, who would make
law. They struggle with one another to get their precious words upon the great
scroll. And whenever one succeeds, the strife continues to have the words erased or
amended. The war has altered the goals of most of the persons seeking labor
legislation and has set the tone and the tempo for legislative battles.
Even beyond the legislative chambers there is a field for influence on labor law.
The courts construe the law and administrators apply it in ways that are just as
effective as the writing of the law. In that realm of interpreting and executing the
laws, too, the war has had its peculiar effect.
If we go back to the President's declaration of a national emergency on Septem-
ber 8, 1939, we may discern our public preparation for an imminent war. From
that time on we can trace the plans and programs for labor legislation. We can
follow the legislative debates and list the laws adopted. We can note the executive
orders and administrative regulations. We can observe how the courts have treated
the laws. From this record, if we can eliminate the continuing force of old laws,
if we can subtract the pressures of traditional groups, if we can discard the irrelevant
and the incidental, we shall have the story of the impact of the war upon labor law.
I. AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL
The Political Perspective. Before attempting a detailed inspection of the war
record, it might be well to view the Washington scene, glancing rapidly over the
past two and a half years, so that the developments in labor law may be seen in
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their national perspective. The prominent political issues of the day, the Congres-
sional hearings and debates, the press campaigns, the fireside chats of the President,
and that uncertain climate called public opinion, all conditioned the form and char-
acter of our labor laws. A brief survey may suffice to reveal the environment in
which the war program and labor law were gradually intertwined.
When in September, 1939, the President of the United States proclaimed a limited
national emergency, it was to observe, safeguard and enforce neutrality and to
strengthen our national defense within the limits of peace-time authorizations.1
There was a widespread concern over neutrality and the possibilities of peace.
Only slowly did the normal legislative programs of industry and labor give way to
the requirements of defense and war. The outstanding labor problem in 1939 was
unemployment. Industrial orders from the countries at war were regarded with
an ominous hopefulness. That year also saw attacks upon the National Labor
Relations Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Public Contracts Act. All
of them fell just short of success. Labor began its campaign for a law to withhold
government contracts from labor law violators. The LaFollette Committee launched
its oppressive labor practices bill, but much more consideration was given to pro-
posals for laws against subversive activities.
The year 194o was an election year in which all political issues were dwarfed
by months of speculation and months more of campaigning over a third term for
the President. There was little preoccupation with defense during the first half of
the year. The reciprocal trade agreements, an anti-lynching bill, the banning of
political activity by state employees receiving federal funds, the court review of
administrative decisions, and the amendment of the Fair Labor Standards Act and
the National Labor Relations Act were the chief topics of Congressional considera-
tion. The emergency situation played only an incidental role in the fundamental
dashes of opinion on those subjects.
The national defense acts that followed in the latter part of 1940, contained
incidental provisions affecting the application of existing labor laws. The absolute
limit of the Federal Eight Hour Law was lifted to permit overtime at premium
pay; and other wage and hour laws were expressly preserved. The most promi-
nent labor law controversy of the year was a culmination of the old dispute over the
National Labor Relations Act. After prolonged public debate, a lengthy Congres-
sional investigation, bitter disagreement within the ranks of organized labor, and
conciliatory overtures by new members of the National Labor Relations Board, a
bill containing significant amendments to the Act was approved by the House.
Because of the pending election and the diversions of the defense program no
further action was taken on the bill by the Senate Committee on Education and
Labor. The other major labor laws were either untouched or amended only in
'Proclamation of the President, No. 2352, Sept. 5, 1939, 4 FED. REo. 385.
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trivial detail. Thus by the end of i94o, Congress had dealt with only a few matters
involving labor in the emergency.
The executive program of the President, however, had developed during the
latter half of 1940 with certain significant labor aspects. In creating the first over-
all defense agency, the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense,
the President assigned one of the seven positions on the Commission to labor. The
President of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, Sidney Hillman, was
made its incumbent and he formed a committee representative of all the major
labor organizations to counsel with him. The Commission early formulated a state-
ment of national labor policy which was approved by the President and submitted
to Congress and to all Government contracting agencies.2 It recommended essen-
tially the preservation of existing labor standards in the performance of Government
contracts. The Advisory Commission also established functioning divisions to co-
ordinate the efforts of the many Government agencies in the defense program.
Extensive plans were devised by its labor division for the training of defense work-
ers. Organized labor looked on suspiciously and insisted upon representation in
all of the divisions of the Commission so that its interests might be adequately
protected.3
In 1941, the defense program became the point of orientation for nearly all legis-
lative matters. The opposition to labor legislation made a new approach through
bills to curb strikes, to require arbitration, to regulate unions, to freeze wages, and
to increase hours as separate defense measures. In February, the House Committee
on the Judiciary commenced its hearings on bills to curtail strikes in defense indus-
tries. Messrs. Knudsen and Hillman, then co-directors of the Office of Production
Management, disagreed in their testimony on the need for such legislation,4 and
the public, the press, and Congress continued the controversy for months. The
appointment of the National Defense Mediation Board caused only a temporary
lull in the agitation. Shortly after the middle of the year, the hearings on the
price control bill" brought to the fore the dispute over the inclusion of wage con-
trols. Only the constant insistence of the Administration on the separation of wage
from price controls finally induced Congress to keep wages from the provisions of
the Price Control Act. In other fields, the proposals of organized labor did not
fare so well. The sedition and sabotage laws and the restrictive alien laws were
2 The National Defense Advisory Commission, Statement of Labor Policy, Aug. 31, X940, recom-
mended the absorption of the unemployed, the payment of extra compensation for overtime, the
elimination of discrimination on the basis of age, sex, race or color, the maintenance of health and safety
and the observance of all labor laws.
' AFL, PROCEEDItNGS OF 6oH ANN. CoNvEN'roN, 1940, pp. 208, 588-591; CIO, PROCEEDINGS OF 3D
Cotsar. CONVTNTnON, X940, pp. 48-49.
'Hearings before the House Committee on the Judiciary on Delays in National Defense Preparations,
7 7 th Cong., ist Sess., Feb. 19, 20, 1941-5 Hearings before the House Committee on Banking and Currency on H. R. 5479, superseded by
H. R. 5990, 77th Cong., ist Sess., Aug. 5-Sept. 25, 194r, and Hearings before the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency on H. R. 5990, 7 7 th Cong., ist Sess., Dec. 9-17, 1941.
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extended over its protest. The WPA program was cut and in the field of social
security there were no appreciable gains. The legislative year of 1941 was one in
which organized labor fought to maintain its previously established standards.
The most significant changes in the legal status of labor during the year 1941
came through the exercise of the executive power of the President. On the 7th of
January the President created the Office of Production Management, with Hillman
as co-director and chief of its labor division. The activities of that division, par-
ticularly with respect to the training of labor, the alleviation of priorities unemploy-
ment, the stabilization of shipbuilding and construction, and the employment of
minority groups, affected labor standards throughout the country. The reorgan-
ization of OPM and the shift of personnel to the War Production Board altered
this work very little. In the realm of labor disputes, the National Defense Medi-
ation Board was created. It succeeded in settling crucial labor disputes for several
months and was then itself disrupted by the withdrawal of the CIO representatives
on the issue of a closed shop for captive mines. Amid public and Congressional
clamor for restrictive legislation, the President called a conference of national repre-
sentatives of industry and labor who agreed to abandon strikes and lockouts and
to submit their disputes to arbitration. This laid the foundation for the National
War Labor Board. Throughout the year organized labor insisted upon an oppor-
tunity to participate in the defense program. The CIO urged the appointment of
tripartite industry councils0 and the AFL requested effective labor advisory com-
mittees,7 but, denied these, they found other ways of expressing their interests
through the existing agencies. The activities of the defense administration, rather
than the enactment of any new legislation, was the contribution of 1941 to our body
of labor law.
In the first few months of 1942 labor legislation definitely reflected the influence
of the war. The first prominent proposal was to provide federal compensation for
workers displaced by the conversion of industrial plants to war work. This aroused
a storm of protest from the state unemployment compensation officials and was
dropped. Then followed a major, though unsuccessful, effort to repeal the over-
time pay requirements of federal statutes. The bills to control wages and abandon
strikes, held over from previous years, were next laid to rest by the President's anti-
inflation program which requested that wage stabilization and the settlement of
labor disputes be left to the National War Labor Board. The creation of the War
Manpower Commission and the reorganization of the WPB labor division, brought
new speculation and anticipation of Government labor control. By May, 1942, it
was clear that federal labor law was definitely considered part of the war program
'Murray, Survey of the Steel Industry (1941); Reuther, 5oo Planes a Day (941); Int. Union of
Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, Research Report on Increased Production of Vital Non.ferrous Metals
for the Victory Program (1942).
'AFL, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 61sr ANN. CoNVENTIoN, 1941, pp. r41, 204, 205, 539-541; Declaration
of American Federation of Labor Policy on War (Jan. 1942) 49 Ams. FEDEREAnomsr so.
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and that, although the legislative scene was calm, important labor adjustment
would continue to be made through the activities of executive agencies.
This chronological view of the legislative and administrative action in the field
of labor law indicates the gradual and ultimate domination of the field by the war.
The war's real influence, however, may be discerned more clearly in a consideration
of the specific action taken in connection with the various phases of labor law.
Under the separate standards of labor we can observe what was sought to be accom-
plished and what was done.
Organization and Collective Bargaining. The movement to amend the NLRA
reached its peak in i94o, at a time when, by mere historical coincidence, the defense
program was being launched. Had labor relations been in turmoil then, the weight
of the defense program might have been turned to the support of the amendments.
Instead, the industrial horizon was relatively serene and the pending election made
it advisable to avoid such inflammatory issues, so the defense program, together
with the appointment of new personnel to the Board and the modification of some
of its procedures, became a diverting influence. Thereafter, further modification of
Board rulings tended to stave off the Act's opponents! Moreover, the mediatory
services of the Board's staff helped preserve industrial peace in defense industries.
As a result, the criticisms of union activity that arose out of defense production
were directed toward other laws.
The first objective of proposed legislation on union activities in defense indus-
tries was the regulation of the relationship between unions and their members. A
few strikes in defense plants in defiance of the recommendations of mediators gave
rise to charges of Communist leadership and the irresponsibility of most union
officials. At the same time, there arose considerable notoriety over the large initiation
fees charged by certain unions on defense construction projects. These occurrences
led to insistent demands for regulatory legislation. The bills introduced were of
several types: (i) bills requiring the registration or incorporation of unions;' (2)
bills defining the legal responsibility of unions, their officials, and their members
for wrongful acts committed in connection with strikes, picketing, and boycotts;10
(3) bills requiring an audit and public accounting of union resources, and limiting
the use of union funds;" and (4) bills requiring democratic procedures in the elec-
tion of officers, the calling of strikes, the disciplining of members, and other union
activities."2 These bills were widely discussed but no Congressional action was
taken on them.
The next union issue on which legislation was urged was that of the closed shop
'Recent Trends in Construction of the Wagner Act (1941) 1o INT. JuaRn. Ass'tN BusLL. 33, 45;
AFL, PROCEEDINGS, supra note 7, at 113-116.
'In the 77th Cong., ist Sess. (941): H. R. 5015, 6o68, 6154 and S.2042. In the 77th Cong., 2d
Ses. (1942): H. R. 6444.
loin the 77th Cong., ist Sess. (941): H. R. 5015, 5218 and 5259.
" In the 77th Cong., ist Sess. (1941): H. R. 4392, 5015, 5148, 5149, 6o68, 6154 and S. 2042.
"In the 77th Cong., Ist Sess. (1941): H. R. 6o68 and S. 2042.
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or union security. The United States Chamber of Commerce and the National
Association of Manufacturers as well as numerous other employers' organizations
proposed that the status of unions be frozen for the period of the emergency.13 The
labor organizations, on the other hand, insisted that since they had abandoned their
resort to strikes they were entitled to collective agreements that would assure them
the continued support of all employees.14 Although they requested closed-shop
contracts, they were usually willing to accept modified forms of union security
agreements. A number of bills introduced in Congress sought to freeze the status
quo,15 but the opposition of organized labor prevented their adoption.
The issue of the closed shop, however, had to be met more affirmatively by the
defense labor relations agencies. Wherever possible, the usual methods of mediation
were employed to induce the employers and unions to reach a voluntary agreement.
When these did not suffice, it was necessary for some of the Government agencies
to make positive recommendations of their own. The National Defense Mediation
Board, attempting to deal with each case on its individual merits, recommended the
closed shop in one case and a union maintenance clause in seven cases, and refused
to recommend either in five cases. ' In a few other cases it recommended pref-
erential hiring or membership encouragements; but, in a much larger number of
cases, the issue was settled by agreement between the parties. When the Board
refused to accede to the demand for a closed shop in the captive mines, its CIO mem-
bers withdrew and brought about its dissolution. An arbitrator to whom the dis-
pute was referred granted the closed-shop demand. The President, however, called
a conference of management and labor to set the terms of an industrial truce. The
representatives were willing to forego strikes and lockouts, but the employers were
reluctant to submit the issue of the closed shop to arbitration and they agreed to
do so only upon the insistence of the President. To implement their agreement
and to maintain peace in war industries, the National War Labor Board was
created."
Wages. In one of his first speeches on national defense, the President of the
United States declared, "There is nothing in our present emergency to justify 1
lowering of the standards of employment. Minimum wages should not be re-
duced.' 8  This was generally understood to mean that in the opinion of the Presi-
dent there was no need to amend the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Walsh-Healey
1" Still affirming their opposition to the closed shop, the leading employers' associations urged that
the status quo be maintained in the interests of national defense. Nat. Ass'n of Mfrs., Employment
Relations (Dec. 1940) 16-22; U. S. Chamber of Commerce, Policies 1941, pp. 3, 15.
"'This attitude was expressed constantly in union negotiations and, although the National Defense
Mediation Board was dissolved on the closed-shop issue, the Board accepted the reasoning of the unions
in recommending union security clauses. NDMB REP. (1942) (mimeo.) 14.
"
5 In the 77th Cong., ist Sess. (1941): H. R. 1403, 1814, 2694, 2695, 5218, 5696, 5738 and S. J.
Res. zo6.
" NDMB REP. (942) app. E.
"
7 Exec. Order No. 9017, Jan. 12, 1942, 7 FED. REo. 237.
1s 5 Trm PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRE ES OF FRANmLN DELANO RoOSEVELT (1940) 237.
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Act, or the Davis-Bacon Act, all of which provided for minimum wage rates in
defense industries. Frequently, war officials testified before Congressional commit-
tees in favor of the continuation of these acts and against other legislative wage
controls. Even when urging wage stabilization, in 1942, the President advised
Congress that no legislation was required. As a result, the war has produced no
significant changes in federal wage legislation.
Some of the early bills for defense powers and appropriations threatened to
waive the laws providing for minimum wages in the performance of Government
contracts. The bills, seeking primarily to hasten the consummation of defense con-
tracts, eliminated some of the customary restrictions on the letting of contracts,
including the taking of competitive bids. Since the Davis-Bacon and the Walsh-
Healey Acts inserted minimum wage rates into Government construction and sup-
ply contracts only through their inclusion in specifications for competitive bids, the
bills were amended so that they expressly preserved the application of those acts.' 9
The minimum wage rates were then determined in the usual manner and were
inserted directly into the negotiated defense contracts. Later appropriation acts also
expressly preserved the Davis-Bacon and Walsh-Healey Acts.2 ° The Davis-Bacon
Act itself was extended to Government construction projects in Alaska and Hawaii. 2'
The defense program, however, was a factor in the defeat of several efforts in
1939 and 1940 to enlarge the scope of the Walsh-Healey Act, primarily by increasing
the number of contracts subject to its terms and by embracing subcontractors. 22 The
War Department expressed its general approval of the basic act but was not dis-
posed to approve these extensions. The Navy Department opposed the proposals
on the ground that they would tend to hamper or delay its preparations for national
defense2 One of the bills passed the Senate, but none was enacted.
The other minimum wage act of importance to war production, the Fair Labor
Standards Act, was not disturbed by the war.24 Its minimum wage requirements,
limited to 40 cents an hour, became less and less objectionable to industry as the
general wage levels of the country rose with war production. A serious attack
made upon the hours provisions was in effect an attack only upon the payment of
"5 Act of June 28, 1940, 54 STAT. 676; Act of July 2, 1940, 54 STAT. 712.
" Ile Second Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act of Sept. 9, 1940, 54 S-AT. 872,
884, and the Appropriation Act for the Military Establishment of June 30, 1941, Pub. L. No. 139, 77th
Cong., ist Sess., provide that the Public Contracts Act shall apply to negotiated contracts by reference
to such a provision in the National Defense Act of July 2, 1940, supra note x9. To the contrary, the
First Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act of June 26, 1940, 54 STAT. 599, and the National
Defense Housing Act of Oct. 14, 1940, 54 STAT. 1125, failed to preserve the Public Contracts Act.
"Act of June 15, 1940, 54 STAT. 399, 40 U. S. C. §276a.
' S.xo.32 and H. R. 3331, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
"Hearings before Subcommittee No. x of the House Committee of the Judiciary on S.1o32, H. R.
3331 and H. R. 6395, 76th Cong., 3 d Sess. (Feb., March, 1940).
"Act of June 25, 1938, 52 STAT. io6o, 29 U. S. C. §§2o-219. This was amended to facilitate
the exemption of workers covered by special union agreements, Act of Oct. 29, 1941, 55 STAT. 756, 29
U. S. C. (Supp. I) §207b(2), and to allow lower minimum wages in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Isles,
Act of June 26, 1940, 54 STAT. 611, 615-616, 29 U. S. C. §5205, 206, 208n. Neither amendment was
prompted by the war.
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extra compensation for overtime, but the basic wage provisions of the Act remained
unassailed.
In 1941, an effort to impose wage restrictions in the price control bill was strongly
championed in Congress35 The Administration insisted, however, that wage and
price controls were too different in nature to be administered successfully by the
same agency, and the Price Control Act was adopted without wage restrictions. 2
However, the inflationary trend continued and wage adjustments were made under
the direction of the Executive Branch of the Government. In his seven-point pro-
gram against inflation, the President assured Congress and the country that wage
stabilization would be undertaken by the National War Labor BoardV7 While the
Board pondered this responsibility, wage limitations were effected in the shipbuild-
ing and construction industries. In the former, the President requested the workers
to forego an automatic increase under a cost-of-living clause in their earlier agree-
ments, and, after some discussion, the unions accepted an increase smaller than that
called for by their contracts.28 Shortly thereafter the construction unions also signed
a stabilization agreement with various war agencies which froze their wage rates
for the duration of the war as of July 1, 1942 9 This agreement set the prevailing
wage basis for minimum wages under the Davis-Bacon Act. Determinations of
new minimum wage rates under the Walsh-Healey Act and the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act were then held in abeyance pending the settlement of a national wage
policy3 °
The War Labor Board, in the first few cases to come before it after the Presi-
dent's anti-inflation address, applied its stabilization policy with great caution.
Wage increases necessary to prevent the pirating of workers from one war plant
by another were given. Other wage issues were handled with a deliberate effort
to avoid setting national policies. In the Board's "little steel" decision of July I6,
1942, however, it established three general criteria for wage adjustments, i-the
maintenance of a peace-time standard of living, allowing only a i5/, increase from
January, 1941, to May, 1942; 2-the raising of substandard wages, and 3-the
elimination of inequalities in comparable wage rates. Further limitations upon all
"See note 5, supra.
"
8 Pub. L. No. 421, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 30, 1942).
"'Message of the President of the United States to Congress, April 27, 1942, 88 Cong. Rec., April
27, 1942, at 3805-3807.
" The Shipbuilding Stabilization Committee of the War Production Board had induced the ship-
building industry to execute regional agreements stabilizing wages, hours and grievance procedures in
1941. On May x6, 1942, at a conference called by that Committee to consider wage adjustments under
those agreements, the anti-inflationary adjustment was made.
2' Agreement between the AFL Building Trades Department and the contracting agencies of the
U. S. Government, including the War and Navy Departments, of May 22, 1942, 5o LAB. REL. RrP. 442.
This amplified a former stabilization agreement executed in 1941, 8 id. 764, covering all construction
financed by the Federal Government.
"The provisions of these acts against wage deductions were interpreted to permit deductions for
war bonds and stamps. U. S. Dep't of Labor, Wage and Hour Div., Release No. z676, Dec. 1S, 1941,
and Release No. 1679, Dec. 57, 1941; U. S. Dep't of Labor, Regulations under the Copeland Act,
April 3o, 1942.
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wages, as soon as farm prices are controlled, were forecast by the President in his
Labor Day message to Congress and the nation.
Hours. Since the maximum production of war goods required great freedom
in scheduling hours of work, the war brought considerable pressure for the
amendment or relaxation of restrictive laws. First attacked was the Federal Eight
Hour Law which made no allowance for overtime in the normal construction of
public works?1 The law itself, as amended in 1917, provided that in periods of
national emergency it might be suspended by the President, and this power was
exercised by the President several times in 194o and 1941, 3 primarily for the con-
struction of island naval bases. Eventually3 3 a definitive provision was enacted to
permit work in excess of eight hours upon compensation at not less than one and
one-half times the basic rate of payY4 Similar provisions for the payment of time-
and-a-half pay for overtime after 8 hours a day and 40 hours a week were enacted
for employees of the Panama Canal, the field services of the War Department,3 5
certain employees of the Navy Department, 6 shipbuilding employees of the Mari-
time Commission,37 and the employees of a Government-owned railroad3
Opposition to such overtime payments, however, arose in Congress and in the
press of the country, and reached a climax in February of 1942. Many bills were
introduced, ranging from those which would permit unlimited hours at straight
pay to bills that would require a specified workweek in excess of 40 hours in all
war plants3 9 Considerable notoriety was received by a bill that sought to repeal
the overtime provisions of seventeen existing hours laws, all of which required
extra pay for overtime in excess of 8 hours a day or 40 hours a week.40 Hearings
were held on a similar bill before the House Committee on Naval Affairs. Repre-
sentatives of war agencies testified that most war plants were operating on an
average 48-hour week and that the schedule of war production did not require the
"' Act of March 4, 1917, 39 STAT. 1192, 40 U. S. C. §326.
"Exec. Order No. 8623, Dec. 31, 1940, 6 FED. REG. 13; No. 8719, March 22, 1941, id. 1622; No.
8797, June 18, 1941, id. 3019; No. 8812, June 30, 1941, id. 3223; No. 8816, July 5, 1941, id. 3265;
No. 8837, July 30, 1941, id. 3824; No. 8848, Aug. 8, 1941, id. 4o69; No. 8859, Aug. IO, z941, id.
4289; No. 886o, Aug. 20, 1941, id. 4289; No. 8876, Aug. 29, 1941, id. 4503; No. 8931, Nov. 1, 1941,
id. 5614; No. 9ooi, Dec. 27, 1941, id. 6787; No. 9023, Jan. 14, 1942, 7 id. 302.
"'In the Act of June 28, 1940, 54 STAT. 676, 679, §5(b), applicable to Government employees on
Army, Navy and Coast Guard contracts, language was used which seemed to repeal the Eight Hour Law.
"' Act of Sept. 9, 1940, §303, 54 STAT. 872, 884. This statute saved the provisions of the Eight
Hour Law of June 19, 1912, 37 STAT. 1381, 40 U. S. C. §§324, 325 (1940). It apparently did not
save the provisions of the Eight Hour Law of 1892, 27 STAT. 340, 40 U. S. C. §§321-323 (1940) from
the broad repeal, for Army, Navy and Coast Guard contracts. See note 33, supra.
"Act of Oct. 21, 1940, 54 STAT. 12o5, and Act of July 2, 1940, 54 STAT. 712.
"Act of June 28, 1940, 54 STAT. 676, 678, §5(a). The President vetoed an extension of this act,
Cong. Rec., July 6, 1942, at 618o, but permitted a temporary 3 months' extension pending more com-
prehensive legislation. Pub. L. No. 652, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 3, 1942).
"Act of Oct. 1o, 1940, 54 STAT. 1092, and Pub. L. No. 46, 77th Cong., 1st Seas. (May 2, z941).
"Act of June 12, 1940, 54 STAT. 348.
"The following bills to eliminate overtime payments were introduced in the 7 7 th Cong., 2d Sess.(1942): H. R. 66r6, 6790, 6791, 6795, 6796, 6814, 6823, 6826, 6835 and S. 2232, 2373. S. 2400
proposed the payment of overtime compensation in non-negotiable defense stamps or bonds.
"H. R. 66x6, 77 th Cong., 2d Sess., introduced Feb. 17, 1942.
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abolition of overtime payment x Furthermore, union agreements independently
of the federal laws generally required extra compensation for overtime. Under
the weight of such testimony the bill was decisively defeated and the movement was
obliged to recede.
The President took advantage of the debate over the hours laws to request the
unions to abandon their demands and their contract provisions for double pay for
work on Sundays and holidays. Such double pay, he explained, had a retarding
influence upon the introduction of continuous operations in war plants. Promptly,
both the CIO and the AFL agreed to withdraw their claims when Sundays or
holidays did not constitute a seventh working day in a week.42 In the shipbuilding
industry, existing stabilization agreements were changed to incorporate this agree-
ment and many other collective bargaining agreements were revised on that basis.3
Some relaxation of the federal hours laws has occurred through administrative
adjustments. At the request of war agencies, special exemptions from the Walsh-
Healey Act were granted for contracts to supply certain canned fruits and vege-
tables,44 contracts for emergency plant facilities, and contracts negotiated with states
or territories for war purposes.46  Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Admin-
istrator interpreted the term "hours worked" to facilitate activities essential for
civilian defense.48 Although the influence of the war was not patent, both the Acts
were amended with Administration approval to permit certain exemptions from
the hours requirements by bona fide collective bargaining agreements.47 The Ad-
ministrator of these acts has indicated clearly his eagerness to make whatever adjust-
ments are needed to assure success in the war.
Employment. The defense program was begun at a time when there were from
seven to eight million unemployed in the country!' Many extravagant estimates
were made of the rapidity with which these workers would be absorbed by defense
plants. Many were reemployed but the process was slow, and a new type of unem-
ployment-priorities unemployment-appeared. The Labor Division of OPM called
conferences of employers, unions, and Government officials who devised plans to
distribute Government contracts to stricken plants and localities and to retrain
and place the displaced workers. For a time the reemployment of these workers
failed to keep pace with their displacement.
Paradoxically, while there remained a few million of unemployed and groups
"' Hearings before the House Committee on Naval Affairs, on H. R. 6790, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
(March, 1942).
SC.L.O. Waives Double Time to Aid U. S. War Effort, 5 C.I.O. News, March 30, 1942, p. 1;
testimony of Wm. Green, Hearings before the House Committee on Naval Affairs, on H. R. 679o,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. (March, 1942) 2803.
"'Penalty Wage for Weekend Work (1942) io LAB. REL. REP. 150.
"Exception of the Sec'y of Labor under Walsh-Healey Act, May 14, 1942.
"Regulation of the Sec'y of Labor pursuant to Walsh-Healey Act, May 26, 1942.
"U. S. Dep't of Labor, Wage and Hour Div., Release No. 1794, April 27, 1942.
'7 Pub. L. No. 283, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. (Oct. 29, 1941). A similar amendment to the Walsh-
Healey Act was approved in May, 1942.
"' Federal Works Agency, W.P.A., Release, Sept. 4, 1941 (mimeo. 4-2266).
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of displaced workers sprang up in centers of curtailed or converted production,
there also developed a shortage of skilled labor in certain war plants and a shortage
of certain skills throughout the land. The situation called for a dual program-
the training of new workers and the placement of the unemployed.
Toward the training of the needed workers, several Government agencies bent
their efforts4 The United States Office of Education increased the vocational
training program in schools. The Department of Labor developed an apprentice-
ship training program. The Maritime Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Author-
ity, the Navy, and other agencies established special training schools. OPM at-
tempted not only to coordinate these efforts but also to develop a program to train
and up-grade unskilled workers to perform semiskilled tasks, and semiskilled
workers to perform special skilled tasks separated from the many duties of the
thoroughly skilled workerY° Most of this was attempted through training within
the plant. The program, requiring no legislation other than appropriation acts,
was conducted as part of the war administration. Its most recent phase has been
the joining of the vocational education, apprenticeship training, and in-plant train-
ing staffs under the Federal Security Agency and the chairman of the War Man-
power Commission.51 In this program organized labor insisted upon direct
representation in executive positions, but so far it has been confined to advisory
posts.
2
The placement of workers in war jobs has been directed by the labor supply
and training committees of WPB. They sought to coordinate the efforts of all
interested Government agencies, but they relied upon the Civil Service Commis-
sion to place personnel with the Government and upon the state employment
agencies to place workers with private industry. In time it became apparent that
the state employment agencies were not sufficiently responsive to the needs of the
National Government and, since these agencies were supported almost entirely by
federal grants, the President and the Social Security Board in several lightning
strokes consolidated all of them under federal control. On December 19, 1941, the
President wired all the state governors that it was "essential that all of these separate
employment services become a uniformly and.., nationally operated employment
service." The few recalcitrants were soon given to understand that the Federal
Government would either take over their employment agencies or withdraw its
support and open its own agencies; and by the beginning of the next month all
the state services became part of a federal system.
" U. S. Office of Education, Delense lob Training (1941); U. S. Office of Gov't Reports, Defense
Employment and Training for Employment (1941).
o The Training Within Industry Program, OPM, LABOR Div., TRAINING WITMN INusRY BRANCH,
BuLL. No. i; Upgrading, id. No. 2; Training Production Workers, id. No. 2a.
1 Exec. Order No. 9139, April 18, 1942, 7 Fa. REG. 2919.
"Organized labor, early in the defense period, outlined programs for the training of new workers
and demanded an opportunity to participate in their execution. AFL, PROCEEDINGS OF ANN. CONvEN-
7ON, 1940, pP. 208, 588-591; CIO, PROCEEDINGS OF 3D CoNST. CONVENTION, 1940, pp. 57-6o.
" Telegram from the President of the United States to the Governors of the States, Dec. ig, 1941.
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In stark contrast to this marshalling of public employment agencies was the
effort to regulate private employment agencies. The House Committee to Inves-
tigate the Interstate Migration of Destitute Citizens disclosed abuses in their opera-
tion that contributed to the confusion, instability, and exploitation of migratory and
casual workersY4 To correct this situation the Committee recommended" federal
licensing of employment agencies engaged in interstate operations and the regula-
tion of their advertising, their fees, and their methods of referral. The need for
such legislation was further developed at public hearings, but no legislative action
has resulted.
Forward strides were made by OPM and WPB toward an adequate enlistment
of labor for war needs through the training and employment of women, Negroes,
and other minority groups. The loss of skills and potential labor power because
of the arbitrary exclusion of certain groups from industry was patently indefensible.
Also, the inconsistency of struggling against the forces of race hatred abroad while
we practiced discrimination in our industries at home became apparent to many.
The National Defense Advisory Commission incorporated in its statement of labor
policy a tenet against discrimination on the basis of age, sex, race, or color. The
President submitted this to Congress,"' and in the appropriation for defense train-
ing, Congress provided for equal treatment regardless of sex, race, or color 5
To implement this principle further, OPM established a Negro Employment
and Training Branch and a Minority Groups Branch. Later the President ap-
pointed a Committee on Fair Employment Practice. These agencies received com-
plaints, conducted investigations, held public hearings, and negotiated with private
employers to remove discriminatory practices. In support of their work, the Presi-
dent required by Executive Order that every Government contract contain a
stipulation against discrimination. 8
In the training and employment of women, the Government's program pro-
ceeded very slowly. There was not only a traditional prejudice against the com-
petence of women but also considerable confusion concerning the time when women
were needed. The Administration anticipated extensive war needs and sought to
start the schooling of women workers and their employment in munitions and air-
craft plants at once 9 The reluctance of schools and employers to change their
habits and the disappointment of many women who found no openings were prob-
lems which were overcome only slightly. On the other hand, despite the President's
Hearings of the House Select Committee to Investigate the Interstate Migration of Destitute
Citizens, pursuant to H. Res. 63, 49r, 629 (76th Cong.) and H. Res. 16 (77th Cong.).
" On Feb. 17, 1941, Congressman Tolan introduced H. R. 3372. He revised and reintroduced it on
May 7, 1941, as H. R. 4675 and on Aug. 7, 1941, as H. R. 5510.
"o Communication from the President of the United States to Congress, Sept. 13, 1940, H. DOC.
No. 950, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.
" Act of Oct. 9, 1940, 54 ST'rA. 1035.
"
8Exec. Order No. 8802, June 25, 1941, 6 FED. REG. 1532.
" Effective Industrial Use of Women in Defense, U. S. DEP'T oF LABoR WOMEN'S BUREAU, SP'c. BULL.
No. 1 (1940); Processes on Which Women Xre Now at Work in Delenre Industries, id. (Oct. 1940).
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statement that there was no immediate need for the military mobilization of women,
Congress hurriedly passed a law creating a Women's Army Auxiliary Corps.6
The War Manpower Commission approached the problems of labor training
and supply with a broad authorization to "formulate plans and programs and estab-
lish basic national policies to assure the most effective mobilization and maxfmum
utilization of the Nation's manpower in the prosecution of the war." 1 It announced
early that it would establish deferments from military service for persons essential
to war production, 2 and that it would make the use of the United States Employ-
ment Service mandatory for the recruitment of workers in war plants.6 3  But the
magnitude and complexity of its tasks have been reflected in the very gradual ad-
vance it has made in coordinating the existing agencies in its field and in develop-
ing its own administrative organization.
Strikes. Despite almost unanimous agreement upon the desirability of industrial
peace in war industries, there has been an extreme divergence of opinion on the
measures to obtain it. At the outset of the defense program, management and labor
were urged to declare a truce, but neither was much inclined to forego any of its
privileges. Gradually, with the increase of the emergency, particularly with each
new aggression of Germany, the prevailing attitudes against strikes became more
firm. Employers recommended their total curtailment. Labor insisted upon pre-
serving its right to strike but agreed more and more to refrain from its exercise.
Both opposed suggestions for compulsory arbitration. The forces in Congress and
in the press hostile to the position of organized labor, became increasingly insistent
in their demands for anti-strike legislation. The Administration, however, was
committed to a policy of voluntary restraints and provided facilities for the volun-
tary settlement of disputes. Our declaration of war added force to the proposals
against strikes, but it also brought a voluntary abandonment of the strike weapon;
so the need for new legislation became less apparent and the basic law remained
unchanged.4
There was filed in Congress a wide variety of anti-strike bills6 5 The outstand-
ing features of most of them were gathered into an omnibus measure and adopted
by the House of Representatives. 6  This measure united essentially two bills-the
Smith bill containing a code of objectionable union practices, and a House Labor
Committee bill establishing a Defense Mediation Board. The former sought (a) to
00 Pub. L. No. 554, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (May 14, 1942).
"
5 Exec. Order No. 9139, April 18, 1942, 7 FED. REG. 2919.
"'War Manpower Comm'n Release PM-3387, May 21, 1942.
" Id. PM-348s, May 28, 1942.
" The man-days of idleness because of strikes declined from 1,396,585 in Nov. 1941 to 476,471 in
December and slightly less thereafter through March, 1942. (May, 1942) 54 MorrHY L A. REv., iiii,
1130.
" In the 7 7 th Cong., Ist Sess. (1941): H. R. 5407, 4040, 4139, 4223, 5929, 6039, 6040, 6057, 6058,
6o66, 6o68, 6070, 6074, 6075, 6o88, 61oi, 6137, 6149, 6172, and S. 683, i8ii. H. R. 4223 (Leland
M. Ford), 5929 (Russell) and 6o57 (Welchel) sought to make strikes in defense industries treason
punishable by death.
' H. R. 4139, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., passed the House Dec. 3, 1941.
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penalize unions whose officers were or had been Communists, Nazis, or felons,
(b) to require a 3o-day notice before a strike or lockout in defense employment,
(c) to require a secret ballot for strikes in defense plants, (d) to prohibit new closed-
shop agreements by defense contractors, (e) to prohibit interference with the accept-
ance or continuation of work for a defense contractor by violence, intimidation or
the picketing of a worker's home, (f) to prohibit all picketing by non-employees in
labor disputes over defense employment, (g) to prohibit the employment by de-
fense contractors of persons to use force or threats against peaceful picketing, self-
organization, or collective bargaining, (h) to prohibit jurisdictional strikes, boy-
cotts, and sympathetic strikes in defense plants, and (i) to require the registration
of labor organizations and the disclosure of finances, membership, officers, and such
other information as might be required by the NLRB. Violators of these pro-
visions were to be punished by a loss of rights under the NLRA, the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, the Social Security Act, and the federal relief acts. The second set
of provisions merely provided for a National Defense Mediation Board with powers
and procedures for mediation and voluntary arbitration and with power to main-
tain the status quo for 66 days after the issuance of its order.
This bill was sent to the Senate and referred to the Committee on Education
and Labor which deferred action pending the consideration by the Senate of two
other bills that had been reported out favorably. One of those bills sought in cases
of strikes or lockouts to extend the President's power to seize national defense
plants, to preserve the status quo as to union recognition, and to adjust wages
through the recommendations of Defense Wage Boards.0 7 The other bill called
for a 3o-day notice prior to changes in conditions of work and routed unsettled
disputes to the United States Conciliation Service, then to the National Defense
Mediation Board, and then to a Labor Disputes Commission."8 The Commission
was empowered only to investigate, publish recommendations, and mediate or,
upon the voluntary submission of the parties, to arbitrate the dispute. The bill also
made it unlawful for an employer to agree to a closed shop under pressure of a
strike. Because of industrial developments and executive action, no vote was taken
by the Senate on either of these bills, and strike -legislation has been allowed to rest.
The action taken by the executive branch of the Government reflected more
vitally the effect of the war upon the law of strikes. The great bulk of disputes was
left to the attention of the Conciliation Service of the United States Department of
Labor which had lcng functioned on the basis of voluntary mediation. The War
and Navy Departments, the Maritime Commission, and OPM established labor
relations divisions to follow the labor situation very closely and to assist the Con-
ciliation Service wherever necessary. To exert the full persuasive force of the war
67S. 2054, 77th Cong., ist Sess., introduced Nov. 17, 1941, reported favorably by Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary on Dec. 1, 1941. SEN. REa,. No. 846.
" S. 683, 77th Cong., ist Sess., introduced Jan. 31, 1941, reported favorably by Senate Committee
on Education and Labor on Dec. 3, 1941. SEN. RaP. No. 847.
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program upon those labor disputes which the Service and the active war agencies
were unable to settle, the President created the National Defense Mediation Board69
and later the National War Labor Board.70
These defense labor relations agencies utilized several special techniques of
mediation. In some cases they employed a panel, ordinarily composed of six repre-
sentatives of industry, labor, and the public, who acted separately or together in
mediating disputes. The agencies also brought the disputants to Washington where
prominent war administrators and military officials could be called on to impress
them with the urgency of the war production program. In arbitration they used
Government or impartial investigators to make field surveys of the relevant facts
for the guidance of the arbitrators.
The principle of voluntary action by employers and employees was considered
basic in the work of these Government labor relations agencies. The compulsory
war powers of the President were brought forth only after these agencies attempted
to obtain voluntary agreements and failed. The National Defense Mediation Board
successfully settled all of its cases but three.7 ' In these the President used troops-
once to supplant workers72 and twice to take the place of management.73 When
the CIO members of the Board withdrew, voluntary action was still requested.
The President convened the national representatives of employers and employees
and induced them to agree upon a continuation of facilities for the voluntary
settlement of disputes without strikes or lockouts.74 Upon that basis the National
War Labor Board was created, and the Government has been obliged to enforce its
decisions through plant seizure in only three instances. 74* The no-strike agreement
was followed by an increase in the number of disputes referred to mediation and
arbitration, but the policy of seeking voluntary settlements has succeeded in all but
an insignificant few.
Subversive Influences. Organized labor has so often been accused of subversive
activities by its opponents that most legislation against subversive influences has
been regarded with distrust by labor leaders. When the extension and strength-
ening of the federal sedition and sabotage laws and the creation of a federal criminal
syndicalism law were proposed there was considerable protest from organized labor.
Even those union leaders who were desirous of having more restraint upon the
militant left-wing unionists wanted assurance that the new laws would not be used
against all union activity.
Congress, nevertheless, proceeded to extend and reinforce existing laws against
subversive activities. It was made a crime to advise, counsel, or urge insubordina-
"' Exec. Order No. 8716, March 19, 1941, 6 FED. REo. 1532.
'
0 F-xec. Order No. 9017, Jan. X2, 1942, 7 FED. REG. 237.
"NDMB REp. (942) (mimeo.) 7. "' North American Aviation Inc. case.
"a Federal Shipbuilding Corp. and Air Associates Inc. cases.
" Industry-Labor Conference, Dec. 17-23, T941, 9 LAB. REL. REP. 461.
'Toledo, Peoria and Western R. R., March, 1942; General Cable Co., Aug. 1942; S. A. Woods
Machine Co., Aug. 1942.
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tion, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty by any member of the military or naval
forces.75 Criminal syndicalism was more carefully defined and applied to the acts
of individuals as well as conspiracies. 76 The sabotage statute was amended to
cover all forms of national defense materials, premises, and utilities.P7 A new form
of control was introduced in the Act requiring the registration of organizations
engaged in civilian military activity when such organizations also engaged in polit-
ical activity or were subject to foreign control.78 That Act relied upon the power of
publicity and sought merely to obtain information on the officers, membership, sources
of funds, aims, activities, publications, and other property of such organizations.
Special legislation against subversive activities was designed for the maritime in-
dustry. Among numerous proposals the outstanding measure was an inclusive bill
which sought to eliminate union hiring halls and strikes as well as to prohibit sub-
versive propaganda at sea and to provide for the revocation of the license of subver-
sive radio operators.79 This was bitterly opposed by all the maritime unions and
most of its proposals were also opposed by employers' associations. Out of the
hearings on that bill, however, there developed a more specialized bill dealing solely
with subversive activities of radio operators8 ° This was passed by the House and
while it was pending in the Senate our country went to war. The Navy Depart-
ment then asked for complete control of the situation and Congress adopted an
amended bill which authorized the Secretary of the Navy to withhold the license
of any radio operator whose presence on a ship was deemed inimical to the interests
of national defense81
The treatment of aliens has also been of concern to labor because of the actual
and possible effects of anti-alien legislation upon the standards of American labor.
The defense and war programs revived proposals to limit the employment of aliens
and to deport all aliens guilty or suspected of subversive activities. Several ap-
propriation acts prohibited the use of federal funds for the employment of aliens 2
and the special permission of the head of a Government agency was required for
the employment of aliens on defense contracts.8 3 After much debate and over the
opposition of organized labor, Congress also passed the Alien Registration Act of
1940. 84 This law required the registration and fingerprinting of all aliens and
"Act of June 28, 1940, tit. 1, §1, 54 STAT. 670, 18 U. S. C. Sq.
76 Id. §2.
"'Act of Nov. 29, 1940, 54 STAT. 1220, 50 U. S. C. §§ior, 104.
"
8 Act of Oct. 17, 1940, 54 STAT. 1201, 18 U. S. C. §§14 et seq.
" H. R. 2662, 77th Cong., ist Sess., introduced Jan. 24, 1941.
o H. R. 5074, introduced June 17, 1941, passed the House, July 22, 1941.
"Act of Dec. 17, 1941, 55 STAT. 808, 47 U. S. C. (Supp. 1) §353 note.
82Treasury and Post Office, 54 STAT. 55; Independent Offices, id. iii; State, Commerce, and Justice,
id. i8i; Dist. of Columbia, id. 307; Interior, id. 406; Labor and Federal Security, id. 574; Emergency
Relief Appropriation Act, id. 611.
" Act of June 28, 1940, §11, 54 STAT. 676.8
'"Id. c. 439, 54 STAT. 670, 8 U. S. C. §§137, 155, 156a, 451-46o (1940); 18 id. §§9-13. The
Supreme Court held a state alien registration act unconstitutional as an invasion of federal authority,
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 (194).
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tightened the exclusion and deportation laws, particularly with respect to subversive
activities.
Other alien controls were narrowly averted. A bill to provide for the prompt
deportation of aliens engaging in espionage or sabotage and other criminal aliens
was approved by both houses of Congress and vetoed by the President0 5 The veto
was directed primarily at provisions in the bill which made it mandatory to deport
drug addicts even though cured; but the President expressed the view that subver-
sive aliens were deportable under existing laws, hence new legislation on that score
was superfluous. Despite this view, the House passed a similar law (omitting the
provision against users of narcotics) to deport alien spies, saboteurs, and felons."8
No action was taken on this in the Senate. The Senate also passed over a bill which
had been adopted by the House to exclude and deport aliens advocating any change
in the American form of government.8
7
Related to these measures in spirit but much more directly affecting labor were
the efforts to deport Harry Bridges, an alien, of Australian birth who was president
of the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union and Pacific Coast
representative of the CIO. Investigations of his alleged Communist affiliations be-
gun when he led a water-front strike in 1934, were followed by a persistent effort
to have him deported. In 1939 there was an unsuccessful attempt to impeach the
Secretary of Labor for not having instituted deportation proceedings88 Within a
few months a deportation hearing was held before Dean Landis of the Harvard
Law School, acting as special examiner, and Bridges was released for lack of evi-
dence of his membership in the Communist Party. The House then passed a bill to
deport Bridges which the Senate rejected as unconstitutional.89 A Supreme Court
decision in another case90 led to a new law authorizing the deportation of aliens
belonging to an organization advocating the violent overthrow of government re-
gardless of the time of membership. 9' On this basis, a new deportation hearing
was held and the examiner found that Bridges was a Communist Party member
and recommended his deportation. The Board of Immigration Appeals reversed
this finding; but the Attorney General accepted the views of the examiner and
ordered Bridges' deportation. The case is now being referred to the United States
Supreme Court with all the indications of a cause celabre.
Safety and Health. The need for continuous and maximum production directed
attention to the importance of safety and health. Prior to the commencement of
the defense program, although the Walsh-Healey Act made it a violation of Gov-
ernment contracts to maintain unsanitary or hazardous conditions of work, the
" H. R. 6724, vetoed by the President, April 6, 1940, 86 CONG. REc. 4157.
" H. R. 9774, 76th Cong., 3 d Sess., introduced May 15, 1940.17 H. R. 486o, 76th Cong., ist Sess., introduced March 8, 1939.
s H. Res. No. 67, reported adversely by the H. Committee on the Judiciary, March 24, 1939, 84
CoNG. REc. 3273.
" H. R. 9766, 76th Cong., 3 d Ses., introduced May 14, 1940.
"o Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U. S. 22 (1939). " Act of June '28, 1940, 54 STAT. 67o , 673.
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Federal Government relied upon state officials to enforce the safety and health
requirements of that act. 2  In the course of the defense program, however, the
Secretary of Labor appointed a National Committee for the Conservation of Man-
power in Defense Industries which enlisted a voluntary staff of safety consultants
from private industry and offered their advisory services to Government contractors.
In 194o Congress appropriated sufficient funds to permit the employment of a
nation-wide staff of safety men so that their services might be made available to
Government contractors on a full-time basis. 3  These men have been used pri-
marily as consultants to supplement the work of state factory inspectors and other
state health officials.
The war Congress both reinforced and relaxed safety laws in other special fields
within its jurisdiction. In 1941 the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Compen-
sation Act was applied to injured employees in our island possessions and foreign
naval bases.94 For the District of Columbia Congress added industrial safety pro-
visions to the existing minimum wage lawY In the realm of coal mining it
adopted an inspection law which rejected punitive sanctions but which started a
necessary program of investigation. 0 In the maritime industry Congress author-
ized the head of any agency administering a navigation or inspection law to waive
compliance at the request of the Secretary of Navy or War.07 Considerable con-
cern was expressed by many concerning the extent to which the relaxation of safety
regulations in law and in practice might hinder the war effort. These few Acts of
Congress merely disclosed some of the complexities of that problem.
Social Security. In no field of labor law have the prospects of progress during
the war been more promising and the results more disappointing than in the realm
of social security legislation. The war economy seemed to offer an ideal soil for
the growth of the social security program. The conversion of industry to the pro-
duction of war goods kept cutting down the supply of consumers' goods available
on the market; at the same time it kept increasing the income of workers. To avoid
inflation it was necessary to siphon off some of the income, and social security taxes
were believed well suited to that purpose. Moreover, the increase of social security
was an assertion of the success of our way of life in the center of a cataclysmic
world. So it was proposed to extend the existing social security benefits to excluded
groups such as domestic, agricultural, and maritime workers, and to develop new
forms of social security in the fields of public health and industrial hygiene. Unfor-
9 Compliance with the safety, sanitary and factory inspection laws of a state was prima facie evi-
dence of compliance with the Public Contracts Act, Act of June 30, 1936, 49 STAT. 2036, 4 U. S. C.
535 (1940).
"SLabor-Federal Security Appropriation Act, 1942, Pub. L. No. 146, 7 7 th Cong., ist Sess. (July
1, 1941).
" Act of Aug. 16, 1941, 55 STAT. 622, 42 U. S. C. (Supp. I) §16jx.
"Pub. L. No. 271, 7 7 th Cong., Ist Sess. (Oct. 14, 1941).
96 Act of May 7, 1941, 55 STAT. 177, 30 U. S. C. (Supp. I) §§4 f. et seq. Originally introduced
in x939, it passed the Senate and was blocked in the House Committee on Mines and Mining. Only
after amendments confined it to investigations was it enacted.
'Pub. L. No. 507, tit. V, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 27, 1942).
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tunately, however, in the defense years of i94o and 1941, Congress was preoccupied
with other issues and failed to concern itself with social security legislation. On
January 7, 1942, in his budget message to Congress, the President clearly set forth
his desire for such legislation s As yet his words have not been heeded.
The first specific effort of the Administration to obtain social security legislation
on a war basis was the proposal to pay displacement benefits to workers unem-
ployed by the conversion of industry from peace to war production. Hearings were
held upon a bill to provide war displacement benefits, training wages, and travel
allowances to such workers. 9 Payments were to supplement state unemployment
compensation benefits by 2o%, but the administration was placed under the Fed-
eral Social Security Board. In view of the recent federalization of the employment
service, this bill was regarded by the state unemployment compensation officials as
the beginning of a move to consolidate their agencies and to remove them from
office. As a result they led a crusade against the bill that was overwhelming. Vari-
ous compromises were proposed. It was suggested that the Federal Government
appropriate $300 million to provide relief benefits to displaced workers100 and re-
imburse the states for payments made by them to displaced workers who attended
classes for war industry. 1° But these proposals were to no avail. The resistance
of the state officials forced an abandonment of federal aid to war displaced workers.
In the field of old age insurance, the states were not concerned but the problems
raised by the war were not very obvious, and no war adjustments have been made.
One of the first problems was the possible loss of benefits because of a worker's
transfer from covered employment to military service. Under the Social Security
Act, old age benefits are computed at a certain percentage of the average monthly
earnings of the worker during the period of his employment.0 2 If he leaves cov-
ered employment, his average earnings fall and his benefits are correspondingly
reduced and may be lost entirely. This situation faced the men who entered the
armed forces, for their period of military service was not considered covered
employment.
To cure this defect, the worker might have his status frozen as of the time he
entered the armed forces, or he might be given credit for the time of his service.'0 3
The wage rate used for his period of military service and the contributions made
therein presented difficulties but not insuperable problems. Unfortunately, no ad-
ministration bill has been introduced to care for this situation. Already the survivors
of some of the men killed in the war have lost the full benefit of their former con-
tributions and many men in service and their wives still face that possibility.
"' Message from the President of the United States to Congress, 88 Cong. Rec. Jan. 7, x942, at 40, 42.
" Hearings before the H. Committee on Ways and Means on H. R. 6559, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., Feb.
11-17, 1942.
1O H. R. 6639 and 6640, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
101 H. R. 67o and S. 2270, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
102 Act of Aug. 1o, 1939, tt. II, §201, 53 STAT. 1373, 42 U. S. C. §409(e) (1940).
' Under the Railroad Retirement Act provision was made to give credit for time served in the armed
forces. Act of Oct. 8, 1940, 54 STAT. 974, 1014.
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Another field of social security even more immediately affected by the war has
been that of family welfare. The enlistment and induction of men with dependents
left many families in need of financial assistance. To cope with this situation the
Family Security Committee of the Office of Defense Health and Welfare Services
proposed an extension of the Social Security Act to provide federal grants for local
public assistance and a law to provide supplemental pay or family allowances to
married men in the armed forces.0 4 The War and Navy Departments also en-
dorsed the suggestion of a family allowance, and after some debate over its amount
and over the desirability of additional amounts for cases of dire need, Congress
enacted a law providing for uniform family allowances.' The problem of further
assistance has been left to existing agencies of relief.
Related to this situation of family need has been the problem of child care. The
employment of mothers in war industries left many children with inadequate care
at home. After investigation, the Children's Bureau of the Department of Labor
planned community programs for the care of such childrenY00 The funds avail-
able for maternal and child care under the Social Security Act were exhausted by
normal needs; hence an additional appropriation was proposed for the state care
of children whose mothers were working in war industries. To date, no such
provision has been made.
A few minor improvements have been made in the Railroad Retiremen °7 and
Railroad Unemployment Compensation laws.'0 But aside from the provision for
family allowances there has been no important extension of the Federal Social
Security Act and no development of new social security measures during the defense
or war periods.
War; Powers and Appropriations. Many statutes of utmost importance to labor
have not borne the label of labor legislation. The early defense acts' °9 readjusted
the Government's methods of doing business and conferred extraordinary powers
upon executive officers. In so doing they found it necessary to reaffirm or amend
existing labor laws. As indicated above, they expressly preserved the Davis-Bacon
and Walsh-Healey Acts, and amended the Eight-Hour Law. A few of the first de-
fense appropriation acts made some minor changes in labor law such as the provision
for cash in lieu of vacations for War and Navy Department employees" 0 and the
waiver of a performance bond guaranteeing the wages of construction laborers."'
"' Jeter, Family Security and National Defense (Dec. 194) 4 SocIAL SEcutiT- BULL. 3-6.105 Pub. L. No. 625, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 23, 1942).
a U. S. DEP'T oF LABOR, CHILDREN'S BUREAU, DEFENSE OF CHILDREN SERIES; Proceedings of Con-
ference on Day Care of Children of Working Mothers, 194!, id. PuB. No. 281.
" The Second Revenue Act of 1940, of Oct. 8, 1940, 54 STAT. 974, 1014, credited military service
for annuity purposes under the Railroad Retirement Acts.
1"' The Act of Aug. 13, 1940, 54 STAT. 785 and the Act of Oct. 10, 1940, 54 STAT. 1094, clarified
the status of coal miners and increased the benefits under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act
respectively.
See note 19, supra. '10 Act of June 28, 1940, 54 STAT. 676, 679.
... Pub. L. No. 43, 77th Cong., ist Sess. (April 29, 2941).
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Other defense measures and the subsequent war powers acts contained authorizations
for executive action that completely altered the aspect of labor law administration.
The Selective Training and Service Act of 194011' established rules for the re-
turn to private employment of the released inductees. The standards of living of
the men in the armed services were also afforded some protection by the Soldiers'
and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 194o which suspended the enforcement of certain
civil liabilities against such persons 13 A provision which became significant in
labor disputes was the section of the Selective Training and Service Act which
authorized the President to seize and operate any industrial plant if the owner
refused to manufacture war supplies ordered by the War or Navy Department.
This section was relied upon in the seizure of plants shut down by labor disputes.
The war also required several enabling acts which made possible extensive and
important modifications in labor regulations. The First War Powers Act, 1941,
gave the President broad power to redistribute the functions of all executive bureaus,
to make or amend all Government contracts (without regard to certain labor
statutes), and to regulate all trade or communications with the enemy." 4 Under
this act, OPM was converted into WPB; the War Labor Board and the War Man-
power Commission were created; the labor supply and training sections of WPB
and the Department of Labor were transferred to the Federal Security Agency; and
the Bureau of Labor Statistics was made more directly responsive to the Chairman
of the War Manpower Commission. Another statute which authorized the Presi-
dent to requisition any property required for defense reinforced his power to seize
strike-bound plants." 5 A miscellany of other powers was provided for in the Sec-
ond War Powers Act, 1942, some of which had significance for federal labor laws
such as the power to waive navigation and vessel inspection laws whenever such
action was deemed necessary in the conduct of the war." 6
The annual appropriation acts have also been of tremendous weight in the
effective administration of labor laws. Through the control of administrative funds,
laws of almost unlimited potentiality have been caused to stagnate, while other
incidental statutory authorizations have been expanded to major fields of labor
regulations. The appropriations granted such agencies as the Department of Labor,
the Social Security Board, and the NLRB to administer statutes enacted prior to
the defense program have been increased slightly to meet normal growth, but they
have been dwarfed by the immense appropriations given those agencies and others
for war labor work." 7 It is obvious that in time of war there must be a persistent
effort to curtail peace-time expenditures and to convert the customary activities of
" Act of Sept. x6, 1940, 54 STAT. 885, 890, 50 U. S. C. §308.
"' Act of Oct. 17, 1940, 54 STAT. 1178, 50 U. S. C. §§5oi-585.
"' Pub. L. No. 354, 77th Cong., ist Sess. (Dec. i8, x941).
... Pub. L. No. 274, 77th Cong., ist Sess. (Oct. x6, 1941).
"'Pub. L No. 507, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (March 27, 1942).
... In addition to the increase of funds for war activities, there has been a tendency to utilize labot
agencies for extraneous war work such as the use of the Wage-Hour inspection staff to detect violations
of priority orders.
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Government agencies to war work, but what has not been so apparent is that the
provisions of appropriations acts have effected a marked change in the nature of
the labor law program of the Government.
Appropriation acts have probably been most significant as labor laws in that
they have provided for employment. The estimates of the persons employed by
the vast war expenditures 18 are one-half a million persons in June, 1940, three and
a half million in June, 1941, and eleven million at the end of May, 1942.11' The
last figure is slightly more than one fourth of our total nonagricultural employ-
ment. In contrast, the public works program of the PWA, the WPA, the CCC,
and the NYA has dwindled; their budgets have been cut drastically and their
functions shifted to war purposes. The most fundamental labor adjustments to the
war have been mentioned in no statutes, but have been directed through the pro-
visions of war powers and appropriations acts.
II. AT THE STATE LEvEL
The defense program was essentially a program of our National Government
and it was not until after the declaration of war that the states began to make basic
adjustments to the emergency. The early expansion of production and employ-
ment brought to the fore many labor problems, but the Federal Government created
the agencies and the activities to deal with them. In several instances the state
governors and labor law administrators were asked to confer with federal agencies
on defense legislation. One of these conferences, called by the Council of State
Governments with the co-operation of the United States Department of Justice,
proposed a state anti-sabotage law.120 Although bitterly opposed by organized labor
and denounced by a conference of state labor administrators, the law was adopted
by many states. The predominant attitude of state labor officials, however, ex-
pressed in an annual conference called by the Secretary of Labor, was that national
unity and maximum production could best be assured by the maintenance of exist-
ing labor standards with as little change as possible12 ' There was considerable
discussion of labor training, safety and health, and the voluntary adjustment of
labor disputes in relation to national defense, but such defense measures required
no new laws. The defense program, therefore, made only a slight impression upon
state labor laws.
The war changed this situation. Although the National Government still domi-
nated the emergency program, the states were called upon to make certain adjust-
'-" War expenditures increased from $x,6oo million in fiscal 1940, to $6,300 million in fiscal 1941,
to $22,000 million by the end of May, 1942. U. S. TR.As. DEr'" Bu,. (May 1942) 6; U. S. Treas.
Dep't, Daily Statement, May 30, X942.
' Estimates provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Division.
..o Federal-State Conference on Law Enforcement Problems of National Defense, Washington, D. C.,
Aug. 5-6, 1940.
"
51 Proceedings of the Seventh and Eighth National Conferences on Labor Legislation, Washington,
D. C., Dec. 9-l, 1940, and No. 12-14, .194, DFP'T OF IABoR, Div. op LABOR STANDARM, BuLL.
Nos. 45, 52.
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ments. In January, 1942, representatives of most of the state labor departments
convened in Washington to confer with the Secretary of Labor and officials of the
War and Navy Departments and of WPB on the need for relaxing certain state
labor laws to expedite the war program. The conference concluded that laws which
might hinder maximum production, such as absolute hours laws, night work laws,
and Sunday work laws, should be relaxed by administrative exemptions rather than
be repealed or suspended by legislative action. A uniform exemption procedure
was outlined for all the states. It called for an application by the war contractor,
an investigation of need by the state department of labor, and the granting of per-
mits limited to a definite number of workers and a prescribed period of time. In
emergency cases, permits might be given first and the investigation made later.
These procedures were designed to meet all war needs, without hesitation, yet to
avoid abuse and to preserve standards for the post-war years. It was decided ten-
tatively that an eight-hour day and a 48-hour week were the optimum hours for
war work, that safety and health laws must be enforced to avoid accidents and
absenteeism, and that there was then no need to modify the state child labor laws.
These standards122 were the basis for the affirmative action taken by the states in
the war program.
Hours of Work. An investigation of the state labor laws that might be con-
sidered restrictive of war production revealed laws in 44 states limiting the hours
of work of women, in 20 states forbidding night work by women, in 21 states
requiring one day of rest in seven, and in 38 states prohibiting work on Sunday."~
There was general agreement that wherever a law impeded essential war work
some provision should be made to waive or suspend its operation. Steps to that
effect were taken in all states concerned. At times the adjustment was effected
through executive action and at times through legislation.
Only eight states had regular legislative sessions in 1942 and eight held special
sessions. Many bills to suspend or amend labor laws deemed obstructive of the
war effort were introduced, but only a few were adopted. In New York, Virginia,
and Louisiana a state labor official was empowered to grant permits waiving the labor
laws that restricted hours of work. The New York and Louisiana statutes124 author-
ized dispensations to facilitate employment on a seven-day or multiple shift basis as
well as employment without the usual hours limitations; but the laws expressly
required demonstration that exemptions were needed for maximum production of
war goods, that other employees were unavailable, that other technological adjust-
ments could not be made, and that the health and welfare of the workers were safe-
guarded. Dispensations were to be limited in time and might be revoked when
found unnecessary. The Virginia statute'2 5 authorized the Commissioner of Labor
'-'U. S. Dep't of Labor Release, Jan. 27, 1942 (mimeo.) (S. 42-41).
... Summary of Laws and Regulations Governing Hours of Work in Industries Manufacturing War
Supplies, U. S. D.P'r oF LABOR, Div. oF LABoR STANDARDS (942).
"' N. Y. War Emergency Dispensation Act of Jan. 29, 1942, incorporated in N. Y. Laws 1942,
C. 544; La. Acts 1942, Act No. 41. "' Va. Acts 1942, C. 105.
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to permit the employment of women only up to io hours a day or 56 hours a week,
with similar restrictions as to time, employees, and war purpose. Massachusetts,
Maine, Louisiana, and Rhode Island enacted laws conferring upon the governors of
those states general war powers broad enough to include the issuance of rules and
regulations affecting labor conditions.' 26 The Massachusetts statute definitely author-
ized the suspension of any law affecting the employment of persons when necessary
to remove any delay or obstruction in the production or transportation of war
materials. These statutes have been applied only in specific instances, upon a con-
sideration of the war needs in each case.
A few more limited statutes on hours of work were also adopted in response to
the war program. Kentucky suspended the observance of all holidays other than
Independence Day, Labor Day, and Christmas for the duration of the war.12 T South
Carolina authorized its Commissioner of Labor to permit Sunday work in machine
shops 28 and Sunday employment of children and women on Government work in
mercantile and manufacturing establishments. 20 Conscientious objectors were ex-
cepted and protected from discrimination. In New Jersey the governor was empow-
ered to suspend or alter the law requiring a 30 minute mealtime whenever such
action would not endanger health or production."'0 Mississippi memorialized
Congress to suspend the 4o-hour week provisions of the federal laws.18 ' These
statutes evidenced the general willingness of the state legislatures to do whatever
appeared necessary to unburden war production of legal encumbrances. Their
failure to enact more such legislation was probably due not only to the opposition
of local organized labor and the state labor officials, but also to the fact that the
War and Navy Departments did not request further legislation.
The federal war officials were generally content with the few changes in state
labor laws because of their relaxation by executive or administrative action. Most
of the restrictive state laws expressly permitted special exemptions for extra work
during an emergency. Where such flexibility was lacking, the new laws supplied
it or the state authorities proceeded under a general implied power of the governor
to issue necessary regulations whenever the existence of the state is threatened. As
a result, permits have been granted for overtime, night work, and Sunday work in
war industries, regardless of the usual statutory limitations. Cases have been handled
individually and the permits adapted to the actual need. Of approximately 1,448
applications filed in the first four months of the war, all but 129 were granted. 82
Those rejected revealed upon investigation the availability of other labor or the
possibility of other operational adjustments. The situation has been followed closely
1
"'Mass. Acts 1942, C. 13; R. I. Pub. Laws 1942, S. 25; Me. Laws 1942, C. 305; La. Acts 1942, Act
No. 148. "'Ky. Acts 1942, S. 58.
.8 S. C. Acts 1942, Gov. No. 904. 128 S. C. Acts 1942, Gov. No. 903.
5 
°N. J. Laws 1942, c. 3. The mealtime was reduced from 45 minutes to 30 minutes and overtime
was permitted from 8 hours to so at time and one half pay for women workers in Louisiana. La. Acts
1942, Act No. x83. ... Miss. Laws 1942, H. R. 38.
... Hours, Overtime and All-Out Production (April 1942) 5 LABoR STANDARDS 33-36.
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by various federal agencies and the continued relaxation of the state hours laws to
facilitate the war program has been assured in all states.
Labor Disputes. Most of the early efforts to enact labor laws aiding the war
program were concerned with the elimination of strikes and other destructive prac-
tices, measures urged long before the declaration of national emergency. Maryland
forbade sitdown strikes,133 Texas outlawed violence in labor disputes,1'34 and Georgia
required notice and a waiting period before strikes or lockouts' 3 California pro-
hibited strikes and boycotts against non-union goods 3 6
The major group of state laws on labor difficulties in defense production was
the accumulation of anti-sabotage laws. There were 8 of them enacted in 1941
and I942p a7 All but two138 followed closely the model recommended by the Council
of State Governments. They outlawed injury to or interference with property and
defective workmanship with intent to hinder or interfere with the prosecution of
the war. Mere attempts, conspiracies, and unlawful entry on property to the same
ends were also prohibited. To placate organized labor, the laws contained a section
preserving the right to organize, to bargain collectively, and to engage in other
lawful concerted activities for mutual aid and protection. California, New Hamp-
shire, and Wisconsin added that the statute was not to be construed to make strikes
illegal'3 Organized labor still opposed these laws and kept down their number.'4
Recently Mississippi enacted a law making it a crime to use force or violence or
threats to prevent anyone from engaging in any lawful vocation. 4  The manage.
ment-labor agreement to arbitrate all disputes, however, made it possible for labor
to withstand all other efforts to adopt such legislation.
Child Labor. The augmented demand for labor in the defense industries
affected child labor regulation slightly although fear of an ultimate labor shortage
caused many attacks upon existing laws. Such laws as were adopted, exempting
newspaper carriers from the child labor law of Indiana, 4 relaxing night work
standards for theatrical performances in California 43 and the District of Colum-
bia, 44 and lowering the age limit for bowling alley pin boys in New Jersey,"'
may have reflected somewhat the" curtailed labor supply due to defense activity.
1'" Md. Laws 1941, c. 340. " Tex. Laws 1941, H. 8oo.
1G5 Ga. Laws 1941, Gov. No. 293. r Calif. Laws 1941, S. 877 (passed over veto).
"' Ark. Acts 1941, Act No. 312; Calif. Laws 1941, c. 184; Colo. Laws 1941, C. 173; Fla. Laws
194r, C. 20252; Ky. Acts r942, Sabotage Prevention Act; Me. Laws 1941, C. 237; Md. Laws r941,
c. 388; Mich. Pub. Acts 1941, Act No. 366; N. H. Laws 194r, c. 47; N. M. Laws 1941, c. 176; N. Y.
Laws 1941, c. 868; Okla. Laws 1941, c. 52; Pa. Laws 1942, Act No. i3; S. C. Acts 1941, Act No. r48;
Tenn. Pub. Acts 1941, c. 158; Utah Laws 1941, c. 3I; Vt. Laws 194r, Act No. s88; Wis. Laws 1941,
c. xo6.
""IlIe New York and South Carolina acts, supra note 137, were confined to the damaging of
military or naval equipment, supplies or stores.
... Statutes cited in note 137, suPra.
"oThe Governors of Texas and Oregon were induced to veto such bills.
"' Miss. Laws 1942, S. 28.
""Ind. Acts 1941, c. 5r. 13 Calif. Laws 1947, C. 287.
"'Pub. L. No.380, 77th Cong., ist Sess. (Dec. 26, 1941).
IN. J. Laws 1941, c. 139.
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Most child labor laws, however, permitted the employment of enough young people
to meet immediate needs and the defense program had its chief effect in discourag-
ing the elevation of child labor standards rather than in destroying existing standards.
The war changed this situation very little. The outstanding field of employ-
ment in which there was a demand for child labor and some resultant legislation
was agriculture. The war industries drew away the mobile labor groups and the
war wage levels made it extremely difficult for farmers to obtain labor at customary
rates. Accordingly, New York enacted a law permitting children 14 and over to
leave school to work on farms for 30 days in the school year14 and another law
allowing the issuance of work permits without the usual requirement of a promise
of employment; 147 California provided that schools closed for agricultural work
may continue to receive state financial aid;148 and New Jersey established a State
Commission on Student Service to regulate the release of children 14 years of age
and over from school for agricultural work and to provide for the transportation
and housing of those sent away from home' 49  The New Jersey law also permits
a week's work of six 8-hour days or five io-hour days and requires wages com-
parable to those paid adults. These relaxations are probably all the more significant
because a wide latitude is generally provided for employment of children in
agriculture.
To avoid a widespread abandonment of child labor standards and to minimize
the abuses of existing lax laws, the Children's Bureau of the United States Depart-
ment of Labor, together with the Department of Agriculture, the United States
Office of Education, and the United States Employment Service, issued a policy
statement on the employment of children in agriculture. 50 It recommended that
young persons i6 years of age be employed before children of 14 and 15, that school
sessions be dovetailed with agricultural work, and that children of 14 and 15 be re-
leased from school only if farm labor could be supplied in no other practicable way.
Such a program called for more than the child labor standards of many agricultural
states.
In a few miscellaneous statutes, child labor .was affected favorably as well as
adversely. School reporting was improved in Virginia;... lunch periods were re-
quired in Maine; 5' and child employment under i8 was prohibited in the penal
institutions of New York. 53 Louisiana and Puerto Rico raised their minimum age
from 14 to 16.in most occupations, reduced the maximum hours of work for children,
and improved their enforcement provisions.833 In relaxing their hours laws for war
work, New York,154 Louisiana, 154' and Virginiar 55 expressly preserved existing
146N. Y. Laws 1942, C. 233. ""' Id. c. 692.
a Calif. Laws 1942, C. 22. 21 N. J. Laws X942, C. 23.
... Polides on Recruitment of Young Workers for Wartime Agriculture, U. S. DEPT OF LAon,
C-nDREN's BuREAu (March X942). '"1 Va. Acts 1942, C. 43.
...Me. Laws 1942, c. 324. "'3N. Y. Laws 1942, c. 828.
""Ia. Acts 1942, Act No. 34x (July 17, 1942); Puerto Rico Acts 1942, Act No. 230 (May 12, 1942).
254 Id. c. 544.
..4 La. Acts 1942, Act No. 41 (July 5, 1942). ... Va. Acts 1942, C. 105.
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standards for minors under i8. On the other hand, Virginia opened theatrical per-
formances to children 156 and New York reduced the minimum age for the operation
of pleasure vessels from i6 to IZ.157 The war need for labor has apparently caused
the enactment of only a few laws releasing children for gainful employment.
Safety and Health. The development of a safety program for war industries has
been much more a federal activity than a state. The state laws have not been
amended,' 15 7 nor has there been a noticeable increase in appropriations to care for
the augmented work load. Several states attempted to concentrate their limited
inspection staffs upon war plants, and in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Wisconsin co-
operative arrangements were made with the federal authorities to use state inspectors
for plant visitations under the Federal Public Contracts Act. Most of the state
activities in the field of safety and health, however, have been unaffected by the war.
A notable exception to the even pace of state health activity occurred in the
adoption of a compulsory health insurance law in Rhode Island,0 8 the first of its
kind in the country. The law failed to provide for medical care, but it compen-
sated workers unemployed because of illness. Although not strictly a war measure,
it opened a new approach to social security in a fertile field with many war
implications.
Unemployment Compensation. In contrast to the inaction of the Federal Gov-
ernment in the field of old-age insurance, the states took positive steps to adjust
their unemployment compensation acts to war conditions. Since the unemploy-
ment benefit payments depend upon the continuation of contributions in covered
employment and the average earnings of the employee during a period prior to
his unemployment, it is essential to avoid a lapse of time for which no credit is
allowed. Time spent in the armed service, in the absence of special provision, is
not time spent in covered employment. To meet this situation 41 states have
amended their laws. One group eliminated the period of military service from the
base period used to compute earnings and benefits; 5 9 a second group froze benefit
rights as of entry into service; 160 and a third group granted the service men wage
credits for each quarter of service 61
Other amendments to the state unemployment compensation acts improved
benefit schemes and extended coverage. The changes in 194o and 1941 followed
some of the 1939 amendments to the Federal Social Security Act and repaired some
of the deficiencies of the early state acts.'0 Nearly all of the states also made pro-
vision to pay compensation to persons remaining unemployed after discharge from
'8 Id. c. z67. "' N. Y. Laws 1942, c. 546.
.... Louisiana adopted new boiler inspection laws. La. Acts X942, Acts Nos. 204, 205 (July ir, 1942).
11' R. I. Pub. Laws X942, C. 1200.
... Thirty states have adopted this means: Ariz., Ark., Calif., Colo., Conn., Del., Hawaii, Ind.,
Iowa, Kan., Me., Md., Mass., Mich., Minn., Mo., Mont., Nebr., Nev., N. H., N. Y., N. C., N. D., Ohio,
Okla., Ore., R. I., S. D., Vt. and Wis.
10 Four states-Fla., Ga., S. C., and Tenn.-have adopted this means.
" Three states-Utah, Ill. and Wis.-have adopted this means.
10' Unemployment Compensation Legislation of 194r (March 1942) 5 SOCIAL SEctUry BULL. 14-20.
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the armed forces.163  In 1942, however, once the federal efforts to obtain war dis-
placement benefits failed, only the state of Michigan felt impelled to provide them."64
New York enacted a law which gave transportation and temporary home relief to
persons offered a job in New York or in a bordering state, and it disqualified for
relief persons refusing vocational training for defense work. 0 5 Other states merely
increased the benefits under their existing laws 60 On the whole, however, the
states have been much more responsive to the war situation in social security legis-
lation than has the Federal Government.
General War Powers Acts. The uncertainty of war needs and the desirability
of complete preparedness led many persons to advocate general enabling acts author-
izing state governors or state defense councils to do anything necessary for the suc-
cessful prosecution of the war.?17 In 1942 the states of Massachusetts,' 08 Maine, 69
and Rhode Island '0 enacted comprehensive war powers acts. Although they refer
primarily to the utilization of material resources and the protection of life and
property, they contain general authorizations which may be applied to the use of
manpower and the determination of labor standards in critical situations. Other
more specific statutes with labor implications were those permitting the organiza-
tion of State Guards.' 1
The exercise of such powers and their effect upon labor standards may be ex-
tensive or negligible, depending upon the developments of the war. So far there
has been little occasion for resort to those powers. As long as the Federal Govern-
ment continues to control the war program as it has, it is likely that such general
state laws will remain mere potentialities.
IN CONCLUSION
The European war cast its influence over this country and our laws affecting
labor in a gradual, though persistent manner. Much that occurred at the close of
1939 and through 1940 was a continuation of earlier trends and an effort to with-
stand the irresistible drift toward war. The emergence of the defense program was
slow and painstaking, and the adaptations of labor law followed a similarly tortuous
course. Our engulfment into the war quickened our industrial activity and led to
more deliberate adjustments in labor law. But the fundamental character of our
labor law was not rearranged. It appears certain that the process is still unfolding
and that significant changes may yet come. Nevertheless in the two years of defense
.. Forty-three states enacted such laws. See Prentice-Hall, Unemployment Ins. Scrv.
"'Mich. Pub. Acts 1942, 2d Extra Sess., Act No. 18 (terminates May 31, 1943).
"" N. Y. Laws 1942, c. 925. 106 N. Y., Pa. and R. I.
.. All forty-eight states organized State Defense Councils under the direction of the Governors to
be prepared for emergency action. .O Mass. Acts 1942, C. 13.
160 Me. Laws 1942, C. 305. 110 R. I. Pub. Laws 1942 (S. 25).
... The following 27 states passed a State Guard Act similar to one formulated by the Fedcral-State
Conference on Law Enforcement Problems of National Defense: Colo., Del., Fla., Ind., Iowa, Kan.,
Me., Md., Neb., N. M., N. Y., N. C., N. D., Ohio, Okla., Ore., Pa., R. I., S. C., S. D., Tenn., Texas,
Utah, Vt., 'W. Va., Wis., and Wyo.
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activity and nine months of war certain definite influences have been manifested
which are worthy of note.
The war has not rewritten any of the major pieces of labor legislation. Insofar
as it has called for new legislation, it has expressed itself essentially through new
statutes. The principal federal laws were either completely untouched or amended
in insignificant details. The Federal Eight Hour Law and some of the state hour
laws were amended more fundamentally. Additions were made to state unemploy-
ment compensation acts and the railroad pension and unemployment acts to refer
expressly to war situations. Primarily, however, the war labor legislation has taken
the form of isolated provisions within the Defense Acts, the Selective Training and
Service Act, the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act, the War Powers Acts, and
various appropriation acts.
Nor have the courts altered their decisions in response to the war. In the period
of our defense and war programs, the United States Supreme Court rendered many
far-reaching opinions, yet very few have shown the impact of the war.' 7 The
Court held federal wage and hour legislation constitutional and reversed its former
ruling on the validity of federal child labor regulation;" 73 it interpreted the lan-
guage of the NLRA broadly to require the writing and signing of an agreement
reached by collective bargaining;' 4 it excluded from the application of the Sherman
Act jurisdictional disputes and boycotts that did not seek the control of prices or
commercial practices; 175 and it reversed itself on the power of state legislatures to
control the fees of private employment agencies 7
In none of these significant labor decisions was the war an influential factor.
The oppression of the Axis powers, however, may have helped elicit from the Court
the impassioned defense of freedom of speech, press, and assemblage in its decisions
denouncing laws prohibiting the distribution of handbills,'77 or peaceful picket-
ing,178 or in its decision upholding the right of a labor leader to suggest a strike
... It is obviously impossible to ascertain the full extent to which the Court may have been affected
by the war. In a recent case counsel for an employer argued that because of the war emergency, the
Fair Labor Standards Act should not be interpreted in a way that would penalize overtime work.
The Court sustained the interpretation sought by counsel, but there is no indication that it did so
because of that argument. Walling v. A. H. Belo Corp., 62 Sup. Ct. 1223 (942).
'l' U. S. v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U. S. oo (1941).
' H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U. S. 514 (1940).
""Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leoder, 310 U. S. 469 (940); U. S. v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219 (1941);
U. S. v. Int. Hod Carriers & Common Laborers Union; U. S. v. Building & Constr. Trades Council;
and U. S. v. United Bro. of Carpenters and Joiners, 37 F. Supp. 19 (N. D. Ill. 1941), a0'd, 313 U. S.
539 (1940)•
""Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236 (194).
"" Lovell v. city of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (i937); Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496 (938); Schneider
v. Irvington, 308 U. S. 147 (1939); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (940); Cox v. New Hamp-
shire, 312 U. S. 569 (1941).
"'8Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940); Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. xo6 (r940); Milk
Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farms, 311 U. S. 91 (1941); Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287 (194); AFL v. Swing, 32 U. S. 321 (1941); Hotel etc. Em-
ployees Int. Alliance v. Wisconsin Employment Rel. Board, 62 Sup. Ct. 706 (1942); Carpenters etc.
Union v. Ritter, 62 Sup. Ct. 807 (1942); Bakers etc. Helpers Local v. Wohl, 62 Sup. Ct. 816 (1942);
Allen-Bradley Local No. siin v. Wis. Employment Rel. Board, 62 Sup. Ct. 820 (1942).
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against a proposed court order. 7 9 The Court also seemed to refer to current dan-
gers in its holding that strikes on board ships, even in home ports, were unlawful."'0
Aside from these few instances, it is not clear that the war was responsible for the
substance or tenor of the Supreme Court opinions in labor cases.
As far as the legislative and judicial records are concerned, it appears that the
war has not altered the basic principles of American labor law. Employees have
the right to organize and to select their representatives free from the influence of
their employer. Collective bargaining is required. The right to strike, though
denied seamen and though voluntarily abandoned by most workers for the duration
of the war, remains otherwise intact. Picketing is protected by constitutional guar-
antees, and boycotts are generally removed from the Sherman Act. Wages, hours,
and working conditions are matters of private contract, subject to the minimum
standards enacted to protect the weak from the strong in the industrial market.
Social security remains as collective insurance against certain risks of our economic
order. So the fabric of our labor law has weathered the onset of war without serious
distortion.
The great changes wrought by the war in labor law have been produced not
through legislation or court decisions, but through the orders and activities of the
executive officers of our Government. The federal officials who developed the labor
training and placement programs, who mediated and arbitrated labor disputes and
stimulated the adoption of stabilization agreements have been making the real war
changes in labor law. So on the state level, the administrative officials who granted
exemptions from hours laws, night work laws, and Sunday laws to meet war needs
have controlled the extent to which the war has relaxed labor standards. All of
the officials have been united in a desire to contribute to the war effort, yet most
have been aware of the long struggle required to obtain labor laws and of the
possibilities of abuse in a complete abandonment of any of the laws. So, wherever
necessary, existing standards have been relaxed, but care has been exercised to pre-
serve a basis for post-war recoupment and progress.
Between the present and the aftermath of the war lies an unexplored sea. The
many attempts to scuttle our labor laws have been resisted, yet their revival is still
possible. The few attempts to advance labor standards within the war program
have not proceeded far, yet they too may be revived. Probably through executive
action more than through legislation may we expect important developments. The
War Manpower Commission has the power to rearrange our labor market and the
War Labor Board may set the pattern for fundamental changes in our terms of
employment. There is still the hope of expansion in our social security program.
The only certainty seems to be that whatever adjustments will be deemed necessary
for success in the war will be made.
17, Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252 (1941).
"'Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 62 Sup. Ct. 886 (942).
